| Case | Rule | Significance |
|---|
| Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988) | FRE 803(8) (Public Records and Reports)
see also FRE 106 (Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded Statements)
FRE 401 (Definition of "Relevant Evidence") | - Resolving a "longstanding conflict" and holding that public investigative reports under FRE 803(8)(C) "are not inadmissible merely because they state a conclusion or opinion." [170]
- "As long as the conclusion is based on a factual investigation and satisfies the Rule's trustworthiness requirement, it should be admissible along with other portions of the report." [170 (footnote omitted)]
- On a separate issue, jury "was given a distorted and prejudicial impression" of a letter where trial court restricted cross-examination concerning the letter and the jury was denied "a more complete picture of" the communication. [170] Because the completeness-information was relevant under FRE 401, it was unnecessary to decide whether FRE 106, codifying the rule of completeness, applied. [172]
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| Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause)
FRE 801(d)(2)(E) (Co-Conspirator Statements) | - Holding that where the requirements of FRE 801(d)(2)(E) are satisfied, no Confrontation Clause issues are raised
- Clarifying that the proponent holds the burden to show the admissibility of the FRE 801(d)(2)(E) evidence by a preponderance of the evidence [182-84]
|
| Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - Holding that a defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights were violated when a non-testifying codefendant’s confession incriminating the defendant is introduced at their joint trial, despite the judge’s jury instruction that the confession was only to be considered against the codefendant. [126]
|
| Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) | Harmless Error Standard | - Holding that "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" [24]
- See also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7, 15 (1999) (under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the court reviews "whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained") (quotations omitted)
- See also Delaware v. Van Arsdale, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (remanding to Delaware Supreme Court to determine whether Confrontation Clause error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)
|
| Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) |
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- Confrontation clause provides the criminal defendant a right to "confront" face-to-face any witnesses giving evidence against him at trial [1019-20]
- Use of a screen between defendant and child sexual assault victim during victim's testimony violated defendant's confrontation clause rights because the screen allowed the witness to avoid viewing the defendant during the victim's testimony [1020-22]
|
| Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) |
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- Landmark Confrontation Clause case holding that "testimonial" statements of an unavailable witness violated the Confrontation Clause unless there was a prior opportunity for cross-examination
- Leaving open the definition of "testimonial" evidence but noting "testimonial" statements at minimum includes statements made to law enforcement officials engaged "in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial" such as "affidavits, custodial examinations, . . . affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions." [51, 56 n.7]
- Supreme Court overturned precedent that had been applied for nearly a quarter of a century, including Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (applying "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" standard to admit statements of an unavailable witness)
- See also Lead Story: After Crawford v. Washington: Early Observations On the Admissibility of Evidence Under the Confrontation Clause, 1 Fed. Evid. R. 83 (Sept. 2004)
- Analysis of key Crawford issues available in the Federal Evidence Review’s Crawford Watch: Status of Crawford Issues
- See also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006)
|
| Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - “We hold that, where a nontestifying codefendant's confession incriminating the defendant is not directly admissible against the defendant, the Confrontation Clause bars its admission at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed not to consider it against the defendant, and even if the defendant's own confession is admitted against him.” [193 (citation omitted)]
- See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)
|
| Danforth v. Minnesota, __ U.S. __ (2008) | FRE 403 (Exclusion of Relevance on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time); FRE 401 (Definition of "Relevant" Evidence) |
- While Crawford v. Washington, as a new constitutional rule, does not apply retroactively in federal proceedings, state courts are not constrained in adopting broader new criminal rules that apply in state proceedings
|
| Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) | FRE 702 (Testimony by Experts) |
- FRE 702 imposes "gatekeeping" role for trial court to admit expert scientific testimony, including that expert evidence is not only relevant, but reliable and assists trier of fact
- Concluding FRE 702 displaced "general acceptance" to admit expert testimony under Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923)
- See also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (extending Daubert to technical and other specialized expert testimony)
|
| Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. __ , 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006) |
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- Victim's response to 911 operator's interrogation was not "testimonial" and not subject to Confrontation Clause because the statement was made under circumstances that objectively indicated an ongoing emergency and the primary purpose of the interrogation was to enable police to assist in meeting that emergency [2274]
- Victim's written statements in affidavit given to police officer were testimonial and excludable under the Confrontation Clause because no emergency existed at the time of the statement and the primary purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a past crime [2278]
- A defendant who obtains absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits Confrontation Clause rights, noting FRE 804(b)(6) (Forfeiture by Wrongdoing) [2280]
- See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)
|
| General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) |
FRE 702 (Testimony by Experts) | - Holding "that abuse of discretion is the proper standard by which to review a district court's decision to admit or exclude scientific evidence." [141]
|
| Giles v. California, _ U.S. _, __ S.Ct. __ (2008) |
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- The forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause requires the government to show that "the defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying"
- Case was remanded to apply appropriate standard
|
| Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998) |
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - Redaction of co-defendant’s confession by replacing a proper name with a blank space or the word "deleted" violated the Bruton rule as the jury could conclude the redactions refer to the defendant
|
| Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) | FRE 404(b) (Other Crimes, Wrongs, Or Acts)
FRE 104(b) (Relevancy Conditioned On Fact) | - Resolving a circuit conflict and holding the trial court need not "make a preliminary finding before 'similar act' and other Rule 404(b) evidence is submitted to the jury" and other act "evidence should be admitted if there is sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the similar act." [685]
- FRE 104(b) allows the trial court to determine whether sufficient evidence has been introduced. Under this rule, "the trial court neither weighs credibility nor makes a finding that the Government has proved the conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence. The court simply examines all the evidence in the case and decides whether the jury could reasonably find the conditional fact . . . by a preponderance of the evidence." [689-90]
|
| Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) | FRE 501 (Psychotherapist Privilege) | - Recognizing the psychotherapist-patient privilege
- "The psychotherapist privilege serves the public interest by facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a mental or emotional problem." [11]
- The psychotherapist privilege "covers confidential communications made to licensed psychiatrists and psychologists" as well as "licensed social workers in the course of psychotherapy." [15]
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| Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) | FRE 702 (Testimony by Experts) | - Holding that Daubert applies not only to scientific testimony but also to technical and other specialized expert testimony [149]
- See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993)
|
| Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) |
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- State interest in protecting the child abuse victim outweighed defendant's right to face accuser in court where confrontation was conducted via one-way closed circuit television, findings were made that use of procedure was necessary to protect child witness from trauma, the witness was under oath and subject to full cross-examination and victim's demeanor could be observed by judge, jury and defendant [840, 852-54]
- Confrontation clause allows use of hearsay statements against defendant because face-to-face confrontation at trial is not indispensable element of right to confront one's accusers when reliability is ensured through other means [846-50]
- Child abuse victim's testimony at trial via one-way closed circuit procedure did not implicate the purposes of the confrontation clause when the witness was competent to testify, did so under oath and defendant had full opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination, and judge, jury and defendant could view witness' demeanor by video monitor [850-52]
|
| Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - Statement of an unavailable witness does not violate the Confrontation Clause as long as the statement (1) falls under a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or (2) bears "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"
- See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (landmark decision overturning Ohio v. Roberts, at least in part)
|
| Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 (2000) | FRE 609 (Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime) | - Holding "that a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the admission of such evidence was error" [760]
|
| Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) |
FRE 403 (Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time) |
- Holding in a felon in possession of a firearm case, that trial court abused its discretion in rejecting a defendant's offer to stipulate to his felon status and admitting the full record of a prior judgment (including the name or nature of the prior offense) when it enhanced the risk of a verdict based on prejudicial considerations and the purpose of the prior judgment was solely to prove the element of prior conviction
|
|
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) |
Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- In applying the Bruton rule, "the Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a non-testifying codefendant’s confession with a proper limiting instruction when, as here, the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant’s name, but any reference to his or her existence" [211]
|
|
Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968) (per curiam)
| Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - “This case presents the question whether Bruton is to be applied retroactively. We hold that it is.” [293]
- “Although Bruton involved a federal prosecution and this is a state prosecution, the right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment” [294]
- See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)
|
|
Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - Concluding “any violation of Bruton that may have occurred at petitioner’s trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” [428]
- See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)
|
| Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn, __ U.S. __ (2008) | FRE 401 and FRE 403 (Relevance; Exclusion of Relevant Evidence) |
- In employment discrimination action, circuit erred by conducting its own FRE 401/FRE 403 analysis without remanding the case to the trial court to make the determination in the first instance
- An abuse of discretion standard applies to FRE 401/FRE 403 rulings
|
|
Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985)
| Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - Non-hearsay admission of confession for rebuttal purposes to prove what happened when the defendant confessed, not what happened at the murder scene, did not violate Confrontation Clause where sheriff testified about the statement [413-14]
- “The nonhearsay aspect of Peele's confession-not to prove what happened at the murder scene but to prove what happened when respondent confessed-raises no Confrontation Clause concerns”
- “The State introduced [Co-defendant’s] confession for the legitimate, non-hearsay purpose of rebutting respondent’s testimony that his own confession was a coerced copy of [Co-defendant’s] statement. The jury’s attention was directed to this distinctive and limited purpose by the prosecutor’s questions and closing argument. In this context, we hold that the trial judge’s instructions were the appropriate way to limit the jury’s use of that evidence in a manner consistent with the Confrontation Clause.” [417]
- See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)
|
| Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995) | FRE 801(d)(1)(B) (Prior Consistent Statement) | - In admitting a prior consistent statement under FRE 801(d)(1)(B), "The Rule permits the introduction of a declarant's consistent out-of-court statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive only when those statements were made before the charged recent fabrication or improper influence or motive." [167]
- "Prior consistent statements may not be admitted to counter all forms of impeachment or to bolster the witness merely because she has been discredited." [157]
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| Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) | FRE 501 (Privilege Against Adverse Spousal Testimony) |
- Holding "that the witness-spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying" [53]
- "Here, petitioner's spouse chose to testify against him. That she did so after a grant of immunity and assurances of lenient treatment does not render her testimony involuntary." [53]
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| United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378 (1992) | FRE 404(b) (Other Crimes, Wrongs, Or Acts) |
- Holding that admission of FRE 404(b) evidence from an earlier trial did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause
- Rejecting rule "that the admission of evidence concerning a crime under Rule 404(b) constitutes prosecution for that crime" is barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause. [387 & n.3]
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United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986)
| Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) | - “[N]o showing is required that the declarant is unavailable for statements admitted under FRE 801(d)(2)(E) [400]
- “Cross-examination regarding [non-hearsay] … statements would contribute nothing to Confrontation Clause interests.” [398 n.11]
- See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)
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| United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995) | FRE 410 (Inadmissibility of Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related Statements) | - A defendant may waive the exclusionary provisions of FRE 410 and Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(6) which generally exclude plea negotiation statements made between a prosecutor and defendant
- "Nothing in the language of Rule 804(b)(1) suggests that a court may admit former testimony absent satisfaction of each of the Rule's elements." [321]
- Former testimony, including transcript from a grand jury proceeding, may not be introduced under FRE 804(b)(1) without a showing of "similar motive" as required under the rule [321-22]
- Remanding for determination whether defense satisfied "similar motive" requirement in seeking to use grand jury testimony of two witnesses who were unavailable due to privilege assertion and may have provided exculpatory testimony [321-22]
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| United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) | Plain Error Standard | - Establishing four-part plain error standard for review of an issue which a party failed to object to before the district court; this standard is now applied to evidence and other issues [732-35]
- See also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) (applying Olano, standard to failure to object to trial court determining materiality in perjury trial)
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| United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317 (1992) | FRE 804(b)(1) (Former Testimony) |
- Former testimony, including transcript from a grand jury proceeding, may not be introduced under FRE 804(b)(1) without a showing of "similar motive" as required under the rule [321-22]
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| University Of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990) | FRE 501(No Peer Review Privilege) | Declining to recognize “a new privilege against the disclosure of peer review materials” [189] |
| Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) | FRE 501 (Attorney-Client Privilege) | - Discussing the contours of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate setting
- Holding "the privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice" and that the corporate attorney-client privilege must be able to reach "below officers and agents . . . responsible for directing" corporate affairs to learn facts relevant to the legal situation and to render advice [390, 391]
- Rejecting use of a "control group test" that protects communications from and to "only the senior management, guiding and integrating" the corporation, as frustrating the goals of the privilege to provide relevant information for legal advice [390]
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| Whorton v. Bockting, _ U.S. _, 127 S.Ct. 1173 (2007) | Sixth Amendment (Confrontation Clause) |
- Crawford Confrontation Clause analysis does not apply retroactively on collateral review
- The second "watershed" exception did not apply under the retroactivity analysis of Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989)
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| Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994) | FRE 804(b)(3) (Statement Against Interest) | - FRE 804(b)(3) only permits the admission of self-inculpatory statements, and not collateral statements [600]
|